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WOMAN’S VOICE/LAW’S LOGOS: THE RAPE TRIAL AND 
THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL REFORM 
 
Yvette Russell* 
Australian Feminist Law Journal (2016) 42(2) 
Abstract.  This article challenges much existing scholarship on rape that asserts that the law 
has reached a best practice plateau and justice for victims is now being held back primarily 
by the aberrant ‘attitudes’ of criminal justice actors charged with implementing that law.  It 
contends that previous writing on rape, law and linguistics has failed to adequately account 
for the question of why law continues to appear systematically deaf to the calls of untold 
numbers of women for justice in the aftermath of rape. It seeks to illustrate law’s continuing 
complicity in the failure of the institutional response to the crime of rape with particular 
reference to the rape trial.  While purporting to disavow sexist prejudice on one hand, on the 
other, law makes no ultimate concession to woman’s unique sexuate difference.  For this 
reason, it continues to enable the conditions that support the full flourishing of ‘attitudes’ that 
prevent the recognition of the crime of rape.  This article argues that the law is complicit in 
its own failure because it is structurally invested, for its own survival and coherence, in the 
exclusion and erasure of woman’s voice, which represents the possibility of a plural form of 
being and thinking and is thus a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of law.   
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
On 8 February 2013, former spouses Michael and Hilary Brewer were found guilty at 
Manchester Crown Court in England of five counts of indecent assault and not guilty on three 
further counts of indecent assault and one count of rape. The offences had occurred around 
1980 when their victim, Frances Andrade, was 14 or 15 years old and a student at the 
 2 
 
Chetham School of Music in Manchester where Michael Brewer was the director of music 
and a prominent member of the community.  Andrade’s mental health had declined rapidly in 
the year leading up to the trial, with the police advising her not to seek counselling or other 
support services lest it compromise her testimony.1  After giving evidence at the trial, during 
which she was labelled a “fantasist” by the defendant and repeatedly accused of lying by the 
defence lawyer, she described the experience to a friend as like being “raped all over again”.  
Andrade said that she felt “fragmented” and that not even a guilty verdict in the case would 
allay this feeling.2  She committed suicide before the trial was concluded. 
It is very painful to hear in her words the pathos of Andrade’s suffering, and words 
which were few; Andrade’s husband stated that she barely spoke at all for three days after her 
trial experience.3  But in between this self-imposed silence, the silence after her courtroom 
ordeal and the ultimate silence of her death, I am interested to think about the imagery of 
fragmentation that Andrade evoked to describe how she felt.  What does it mean to say that 
one feels ‘fragmented’ after one has testified to rape in a courtroom setting?  What is it about 
the courtroom, the most prominent forum by which law dispenses ‘justice’ that induces this 
reaction?  We can’t ask Andrade what she meant, and I don’t mean to put words into her 
mouth or to employ her words in a circular academic exercise for my own gratification that 
divorces them from their speaker. But I do mean to believe her when she testified to her rape, 
                                                          
* Yvette Russell is a lecturer in law at the University of Bristol (yvette.russell@bristol.ac.uk).  The author 
would like to convey her gratitude for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper to Joanne Conaghan, 
Peter Fitzpatrick, Rosemary Hunter, Catherine Kelly, Nick Piška and two anonymous reviewers. 
1 Elizabeth Sanderson and Tom Hendry, “My wife killed herself because she was on trial, not the choirmaster”: 
Husband's anguished account of how abused wife spiralled [sic] to suicide after court ordeal (online) 10 Feb 
2013 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2276229/Frances-Andrade-Husbands-anguished-account-abused-
wife-spiralled-suicide-court-ordeal.html (accessed 28 Jul 2016).  In England and Wales evidence law limits the 
extent to which the prosecution can prepare a witness for testimony.  Evidence that a witness has been ‘coached’ 
prior to giving testimony, either by police, prosecutors or others, can be drawn on in court by the defence to 
undermine witness credibility and to infer that the evidence given is contaminated.  It can also constitute 
grounds for appeal.  Witnesses may be familiarised with the court layout and process but not ‘trained’ to give 
their evidence.  See further, Momodou and Limani [2005] EWCA Crim 177. 
2 Sara Pidd and Philippa Ibbotson, Sexual abuse victim killed herself after giving evidence at choirmaster trial 
(online) 8 Feb 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/feb/08/sexual-abuse-victim-killed-herself-trial 
(accessed 14 May 2014). 
3 Sanderson and Hendry above note 1. 
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and to how she felt after she’d talked about it in court, and to take these words as the basis for 
careful academic enquiry.   
The imagery of fragmentation that Andrade evoked in the aftermath of her rape trial is 
one that has been called up before by feminist scholars interrogating women’s experiences of 
the criminal justice system in the aftermath of rape.4  In this article I explore further the 
reasons for this fragmentation, and in so doing, challenge much existing scholarship on rape 
that asserts that the law has reached a best practice plateau and justice for victims is now 
being held back primarily by the aberrant ‘attitudes’ of criminal justice actors charged with 
implementing that law.5  Elsewhere I have argued that the primary reason that liberal law 
reform has failed to live up to its goal of increasing successful criminal justice outcomes for 
rape victims is the continuing commitment of Western legislatures, despite the appearance of 
‘progressive’ reform, to sexual indifference.6  In this paper I develop this thesis further with 
reference to the implementation of the law in the rape trial.  
Research into the experience of complainants as they give evidence during the rape 
trial has consistently illustrated the institutional impediments they face when attempting to 
represent their story to and through law.7  The micro-techniques of legal discourse which 
                                                          
4 Kristin Bumiller, In an abusive state: How neoliberalism appropriated the feminist movement against sexual 
violence (Duke University Press 2008); Alison Young, ‘Waste land of the law, the wordless song of the rape 
victim’ (1999) 22 Melbourne University Law Review 442. 
5 Katrin Hohl and Elizabeth Stanko, ‘Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: Fresh evidence on the 
attrition problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12(3) European Journal of Criminology 324; Jan Jordan, 
‘Justice for rape victims? The spirit may sound willing, but the flesh remains weak’ in Dean Ross and Stuart 
Wilson (eds) Crime, victims and policy: International contexts, local experiences (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 
84; Susan Leahy, ‘Bad laws or bad attitudes? Assessing the impact of societal attitudes upon the conviction rate 
for rape in Ireland’ (2014) 14 Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies 18; Ilene Seidman and Susan Vickers, ‘The 
second wave: An agenda for the next thirty years of law reform’ (2005) 38 Suffolk University Law Review 467; 
Vivian Stern, The Stern review (Government Equalities Office 2010); Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahé, 
Sexual assault and the justice gap: A question of attitude (Hart 2008).   
6 Yvette Russell, ‘Thinking sexual difference through the law of rape’ (2013) 24(3) Law and Critique 255. 
7 Judith Herman, ‘Justice from the victim’s perspective’ (2005) 11(5) Violence against Women 571; Liz Kelly, 
Jo Lovett and Linda Regan, A gap or a chasm? Attrition in reported rape cases (Home Office, 2005); Amanda 
Konradi, Taking the stand: Rape survivors and the prosecution of rapists (Praeger 2007); Wendy Larcombe, 
‘The “ideal” victim v successful rape complainants: Not what you might expect’ (2002) 10 Feminist Legal 
Studies 131; Jeanne Gregory and Sue Lees, ‘Attrition in rape and sexual assault cases’ (1996) 36(1) British 
Journal of Criminology 1; Sue Lees, Ruling passions: sexual violence, reputation, and the law (Open University 
1997); Julia Quilter, ‘Re-framing the rape trial: Insights from critical theory about the limitations of legislative 
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operate imperceptibly, but incredibly effectively, to variously silence, discipline and cow the 
rape complainant during the trial have also been extensively catalogued.8  In this article I 
consider this literature again and argue that the structural bias inherent in the courtroom 
process exacerbate and compound the cultural consequences of sexual indifference by giving 
it a new legitimacy through the logos of law.  It is my contention that law is complicit in 
many ways in the failure of its own provisions and that this is because it relies, for its own 
survival and coherence, on the erasure of woman as a subject.  In this article I address the 
ways in which this erasure contributes to the fragmentation and undermining of female rape 
victims in the rape trial while reiterating the continuing need for critical rape scholars to peer 
beneath the text of the law and not simply assume its benevolence.9   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reform (2011) 35 Australian Feminist Law Journal 23; Carol Smart, Feminism and the power of law (Routledge 
1989); Jennifer Temkin, Rape and the legal process (OUP 2002); Young above note 4.   
8 John M. Conley and William M. O'Barr, Just words: Law, language, and power (University of Chicago Press 
2005); Susan Ehrlich, Representing rape: Language and sexual consent (Routledge 2001); Louise Ellison, 
‘Cross-examination in rape trials’ (1998) Criminal Law Review 605; Nicola Henry, ‘The impossibility of 
bearing witness: wartime rape and the promise of justice’ (2010) 16 Violence against Women 1098; June 
Luchjenbroers and Michelle Aldridge, ‘Conceptual manipulation by metaphors and frames: Dealing with rape 
victims in legal discourse’ (2007) 27(3) Text and Talk: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse 
Communication Studies 339; Gregory Matoesian, Reproducing rape domination through talk in the courtroom 
(University of Chicago Press 1993), Law and the language of identity: Discourse in the William Kennedy Smith 
rape trial (OUP 2001), ‘You might win the battle but lose the war: Multimodal, interactive, and extralinguistic 
aspects of witness resistance’ (2008) 36(3) Journal of English Linguistics 195, ‘Language and material conduct 
in legal discourse’ (2013) 17(5) Journal of Sociolinguistics 634; Peggy Reeves Sanday, A woman scorned: 
Acquaintance rape on trial (University of California Press 1997); Andrew Taslitz, Rape and the culture of the 
courtroom (NYU 1999); Sarah Zydervelt, Rachel Zajac, Andy Kaladelfos and Nina Westera, ‘Lawyers’ 
strategies for cross-examining rape complainants: Have we moved beyond the 1950s?’ (2016) British Journal of 
Criminology doi: 10.1093/bjc/azw023. 
9 In conceptualising rape as a fundamentally gendered crime and one mediated by sexual difference, a 
consideration of the rape of men and their experience of the rape trial would necessarily require an independent 
analysis.  As Louise du Toit has argued, the abjection of the body caused by the act of rape cannot be 
generalised to all bodies similarly.  The abjection of women during rape occurs against a backdrop of a body 
already coded as abject; as waste, excess and mere matter.  While the male victim is abjected by his 
feminisation during rape, this is not directly comparable to the female victim.  “There is ... not a similar moment 
of recognition for the male rape victim, and he is likely to see the road to the recovery of his humanity as 
leading through a recovery or reconstitution of his masculinity, which in our symbolic order is closely aligned 
with the ability to overcome or subjugate the feminine.” Louise du Toit, ‘Sexual specificity, rape law reform and 
the feminist quest for justice’ (2012) 31(2) South African Journal of Philosophy 465 at 475.  In conceiving of 
the framework as I do in this paper there is an implicit erasure of other important axes of difference, like those 
of race and class.  It is not my intention to relegate that discussion to a footnote, but to acknowledge its absence 
as I make a specific theoretical intervention into the literature on rape as it intersects with sexual difference. 
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2.0  RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL REFORM  
Few pithy statements so aptly summarise the vast weight of history as English jurist 
Matthew Hale’s 1736 edict on rape.  Rape, he said, “is an accusation easily to be made and 
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho’ never so innocent”.10   
That this understanding of rape has endured so well in the popular and penal imaginary 
despite mountains of evidence to the contrary, attests to the continuing need to both 
deconstruct the ideological tools that maintain its ubiquity and to reconstruct a new story in 
the void that it leaves.  Feminist scholars and activists have led this attempt at reconstruction, 
which has intensified over the last 40 years, and has often involved partnering with state 
institutions and legislatures globally.  These collaborations have sought to implement 
sweeping legal and policy change to address the ‘justice gap’ between the prevalence of 
sexual violence, and the relatively meagre criminal justice response.11  Examples of these 
changes include substantive modifications to the essential elements of many criminal 
offences, and significant changes to the laws of evidence, including the abolition of the 
requirement in sexual offences trials that the judge issue a warning to the jury that a woman’s 
evidence alone, in the absence of independent corroboration, must be treated with caution, the 
restriction of the use of previous sexual history evidence in rape trials - evidence that was 
frequently used to impugn the credibility of a complainant and to invite inferences of her 
consent12 -  and the relaxation of procedural rules around the format and method by which the 
victim’s evidence had to be given in court.13  Policy changes include the mainstream 
                                                          
10 Matthew Hale, History of the pleas of the crown (Sollom Emlyn 1736) 635.  This book was published 
posthumously some 60 years after Hale’s death. 
11 Kelly and others above note 7; Temkin and Krahé above note 5.   
12 Previous sexual history evidence, arguably, continues to function to impugn complainant credibility 
notwithstanding legislative attempts to limit its use.  In England and Wales, for example, an evaluation in 2006 
of the operation of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 found that trial judges had 
interpreted the section as providing them a broad discretion to admit previous sexual history evidence to ensure 
a ‘fair trial’.  See, Liz Kelly, Jennifer Temkin and Sue Griffith, Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation 
limiting sexual history evidence in rape trials (Home Office Online Report 20/06 2006). 
13 In a number of jurisdictions, for example, vulnerable witnesses can choose to submit their evidence behind a 
shield or by closed-circuit television bypassing the courtroom all together. 
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provision of specialised first-responder services, police and prosecutors to deal with sexual 
violence cases, provision of victim advocates or ombudsmen in various jurisdictions, and 
specialist courts. Alongside substantive legal and policy changes have sat enhanced provision 
of tools for measurement and institutional reporting, requirements for increased transparency, 
and independent monitoring of state bodies and their implementation of new laws. 
As the dust has settled over this frenzy of law and policy reform in the last 10 years, 
feminist scholars in many jurisdictions have had to confront a more sobering reality in the 
form of a general consensus that the law appears to have failed to make any meaningful 
changes to the institutional response to rape.14  Attrition persists at every point of the system, 
and while reporting rises, criminal justice measures such as police ‘no-crime’ rates,15 
prosecutions, and convictions stagnate. 
Responses to the failure of liberal legal initiatives to ‘deal’ with the rape problem 
have varied, with some scholars pointing to the need to critically interrogate the meaning of 
‘justice’ in this context, and to pursue alternative and innovative responses to sexual violence 
both within and outside the traditional apparatuses of the state.16  Simultaneously, there is a 
                                                          
14 Holly Johnson, ‘Limits of a criminal justice response: Trends in police and court processing of sexual assault’ 
Elizabeth Sheehy in Sexual assault in Canada: Law, legal practice and women’s activism (University of Ottawa 
Press 2012) 305; Jan Jordan, ‘Here we go round the review-go-round: Rape investigation and prosecution – are 
things getting worse not better?’ (2011) 17(3) Journal of Sexual Aggression 234; Wendy Larcombe, ‘Limits of 
the criminal law for preventing sexual violence’ in Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell (eds) Preventing sexual 
violence: Interdisciplinary approaches to overcoming a rape culture (Palgrave Macmillan 2014); Clare 
McGlynn and Vanessa E. Munro (eds) Rethinking rape law: International and comparative perspectives 
(GlassHouse 2010); Nicole Westmarland and Geetanjali Gangoli (eds) International approaches to rape (Policy 
Press 2012).   
15 There remains a huge disparity among police districts in England and Wales, for example, in the translation of 
reported offences to recorded offences; the phenomenon of ‘no-criming’ incidents reported as rape is common 
practice in some police districts.  The Home Office Counting Rules define the circumstances under which a 
crime report may be ‘no crimed’. These include situations where a crime is considered to have been recorded in 
error or where, having been recorded, additional verifiable information becomes available that determines that 
no crime was committed, which can include details uncovered during investigations, retractions of allegations 
and occasions where it is later determined the offence took place under another force’s jurisdiction. The level of 
evidence needed to ‘no crime’ is higher than for the recording of a crime as it requires information to be 
available that determines that the offence did not happen, rather than the “balance of probabilities that a crime 
did happen”. (see further, Ministry of Justice, Home Office and the Office for National Statistics, An overview of 
sexual offending in England and Wales (Home Office 2013) at 65). 
16 Wendy Larcombe, ‘Falling rape conviction rates: (Some) feminist aims and measures for rape law’ (2011) 
19(1) Feminist Legal Studies 27; Clare McGlynn, Nicole Westmarland and Nikki Godden ‘“I just wanted him to 
 7 
 
growing body of research attesting to the ways in which feminist-led rape reform initiatives 
have been ‘captured’ by the political apparatus and used to justify the increasing use of state 
violence disproportionately against poor and racialised communities, with no concurrent 
concession to rethinking the state’s role in regulating gendered relations.17  
For those still clinging to the siren call of law, the response has been more uniform 
and involved a need to diagnose the reasons for the continuing failure of liberal legal reform 
to address the rape problem.  This scholarship is usually accompanied by a wary nod to the 
contingency of feminist project in law,18 but with the recognition that we must not let the 
criminal law “off the hook” for its complicity in the perpetuation of the sexual violence 
justice gap.19  From the vast swathe of academic and state-sponsored literature in this vein 
two conclusions come through most clearly.  It is argued first, that while law and policy 
seems to have nearly hit a plateau of ‘best practice’, its inconsistent implementation is 
responsible for a significant amount of attrition. Second, it is argued that there are simply 
forces operating outside the strict remit of the criminal justice system over which it has no 
direct control.  The contention here is that ‘rape myth acceptance’ haunts popular culture and, 
by viral-like extension, is suffused within the criminal justice apparatus infecting almost 
every avenue the state offers to deal with the rape problem.20  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
hear me”: Sexual violence and the possibilities of restorative justice.’ (2011) 39 Journal of Law and Society 
213; Anastasia Powell, Nicola Henry and Asher Flynn (eds) Rape justice: Beyond the criminal law (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2015).   
17 Bumiller above note 4; Kristin Bumiller, ‘Feminist collaboration with the state in response to sexual violence’ 
in Aili Mari Tripp, Myra Marx Ferree, Christina Ewig (eds) Gender, violence, and human security: Critical 
feminist perspectives (NYU 2013) 191, ‘Explaining the volte-face: Turning away from the criminal law and 
returning to the quest for gender equality’ in Rosemary Gartner and Bill McCarthy (eds) The Oxford handbook 
of gender, sex, and crime, (OUP 2014) 118; Rose Corrigan, Up against a wall: Rape reform and the failure of 
success (NYU 2013); Aya Gruber, ‘Rape, feminism, and the war on crime’ (2009) 84 Washington Law Review 
581.   
18 Rosemary Hunter (ed) Rethinking equality projects in law: Feminist challenges (Hart 2008); Larcombe above 
note 16.  
19 Vanessa E. Munro, Law and politics at the perimeter: Re-evaluating key debates in feminist theory (Hart 
2007) at 72.   
20 Gerd Bohner, Friederike Eyssel, Afroditi Pina, Frank Siebler, and G. Tendayi Viki, ‘Rape myth acceptance: 
cognitive, affective and behavioural effects of beliefs that blame the victim and exonerate the perpetrator’ in 
Miranda Horvath and Jennifer Brown (eds) Rape: Challenging contemporary thinking (Willan 2009) 17; Louise 
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Observations like these have spawned a massive body of feminist-led socio-
psychological and legal research into the way that ‘attitudes’ develop and manifest in culture 
and also in tribunal settings.  Attrition is said to ‘map onto criminal justice’ despite 
mechanisms in place to avoid this, in ways that perpetuate rather than challenge the dominant 
narrative of woman’s complicity in rape.21  A self-perpetuating cycle seems, therefore, to 
underpin and ultimately thwart government-driven attempts to deal with the ‘rape problem’.  
This cycle is attested to by research at every point of the criminal justice apparatus, from the 
police,22 to prosecuting bodies,23 the judiciary,24 and finally, to the one ultimate, supposed, 
constitutional stop on executive and judicial power: the jury.25  
This need to move outside the system to investigate the forces working on the system 
now drives a significant amount of feminist analysis of rape law and practice and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ellison and Vanessa E. Munro, ‘A stranger in the bushes, or an elephant in the room? Critical reflections upon 
received rape myth wisdom in the context of a mock jury study’ (2010) 13(4) New Criminal Law Review 781, 
‘Better the devil you know? Real rape stereotypes and the relevance of a previous relationship in (mock) juror 
deliberations’ (2013) 17(4) The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 299; Heike Gerger, Hanna Kley, 
Gerd Bohner and Frank Siebler, ‘The acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression scale: Development 
and validation in German and English’ (2007) 33 Aggressive Behavior 422; Jennifer Temkin, Jacqueline M. 
Gray and Jastine Barrett, ‘Different functions of rape myth use in court findings from a trial observation study’ 
(2016) Feminist Criminology doi: 10.1177/1557085116661627.  
21 Hohl and Stanko above note 5; Liz Kelly, ‘The (in)credible words of women: False allegations in European 
rape research’ (2010) 16 Violence against Women 1345; Vanessa E. Munro and Liz Kelly, ‘A vicious cycle? 
Attrition and conviction patterns in contemporary rape cases in England and Wales’ in Miranda Horvath and 
Jennifer Brown (eds) Rape: Challenging contemporary thinking (Willan 2009) 281.   
22 Louise Ellison, Vanessa E Munro, Katrin Hohl and Paul Wallang, ‘Challenging criminal justice? Psychosocial 
disability and rape victimization’ (2015) 15(2) Criminology and Criminal Justice 225; Hohl and Stanko above 
note 5; Stern above note 5. 
23 Rt Hon Dame Elish Angiolini, DBE QC, Report of the Independent Review into The Investigation and 
Prosecution of Rape in London (online) April 30 2015 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/equality/vaw/dame_elish_angiolini_rape_review_2015.pdf  (accessed 30 
July 2016); Clare Gunby, Anna Carline and Caryl Beynon, ‘Alcohol-related rape cases: Barristers’ perspectives 
on rape and the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and its impact on practice’ (2010) 74 Journal of Criminal Law 579. 
24 Patricia Easteal and Miriam Gani, ‘Sexual assault by male partners: A study of sentencing variables’ (2005) 9 
Southern Cross Law Review 39; Jessica Kennedy and Patricia Easteal, ‘Colour “black letter” sexual assault law 
reform grey: An Australian example’ in Jaya Sagade, Vedna Jivan and Christine Forster (eds) Feminism in the 
subcontinent and beyond: Challenging laws, changing laws (Eastern Book Company 2014) 107. 
25 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E. Munro, ‘Reacting to rape exploring mock jurors' assessments of complainant 
credibility’ (2009) 49(2) British Journal of Criminology 202, ‘Of ‘normal sex’ and ‘real rape’: Exploring the use 
of socio-sexual scripts in (mock) jury deliberation’ (2009) 18(3) Social and Legal Studies 291, ‘A stranger in the 
bushes, or an elephant in the room?’ above note 20, ‘Getting to (not) guilty: examining jurors' deliberative 
processes in, and beyond, the context of a mock rape trial’ (2010) 30(1) Legal Studies 74, ‘Better the devil you 
know?’ above note 20; Emily Finch and Vanessa E. Munro, ‘Breaking boundaries? Sexual consent in the jury 
room’ (2006) 26(3) Legal Studies 303, ‘The demon drink and the demonized woman: Socio-sexual stereotypes 
and responsibility attribution in rape trials involving intoxicants’ (2007) 16(4) Social and Legal Studies 591.  
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necessity of this work to solving the rape problem is recognised by a shared consensus among 
most feminist scholars working on rape.  While I certainly form part of that consensus, I 
remain sceptical of some of the assumptions upon which it proceeds.  An important one of 
these is the idea that if we can only ‘fix’ attitudes then law and policy will be free to operate 
in the world as it should.  The assumption then is that by calibrating the law in such a way 
that can be said to represent ‘best practice’, it returns to its status as a neutral, inanimate force 
for good simply waiting patiently for us to sort out our attitudes and put it to work.  In this 
narrative attitudes arise spontaneously from the lives, histories and culture of individuals, 
which is certainly true.  However, in my argument these attitudes are tacitly nurtured, enabled 
and supported by the law and associated policy that at the same time purports to disavow 
them.    
Elsewhere I have argued that the legislative framework that dictates the confines and 
contours of the crime of rape fixes in law a neutral sexless subject that ultimately serves to 
militate against justice for rape victims.26  Through an exploration of the blind spots of the 
current legislative framework in the United Kingdom, I suggested that the conceptual 
framework that underpins most contemporary rape law is one of sexual indifference that 
erases woman as subject in favour of a masculine legal subject through which it is very 
difficult to express or articulate the unique harm of rape to law.  The only way that woman 
can become coherent before the law is to assume a position in respect of that masculine 
subject as either double, defective or opposite.  I want to extend that analysis here by 
considering specifically the manifestation of the text of rape law in the trial.  Much of the 
scholarly work that addresses the micro-processes of the rape trial endorses the analytic 
distinction made by some feminist rape scholars who sever the examination of ‘attitudes’ to 
rape, from the text of the law that is being interpreted as well as its discursive manifestation 
                                                          
26 Russell above note 6. 
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in the trial.  A good example of this type of analysis can be found in the writing of Gregory 
Matoesian, linguist and criminologist and long-time scholar of ‘trial talk’ in the courtroom, 
whose work I now go on to consider, in the context of a discussion of the sexual indifference 
of the rape trial. 
 
2.1  The Rape Trial 
 
There is by now a vast body of scholarship exploring victim experiences of the rape 
trial through several different frameworks with reference to the use, distribution and effect of 
various discursive tools of legal discourse and courtroom parlance.27  Much of this work has 
illustrated how micro-techniques of legal discourse are marshalled in the service of 
destroying a complainant’s ability to represent her story.  Courtroom procedure empowers 
experts, lawyers and judges linguistically over the witnesses they examine.  A lawyer 
questioning a witness has considerable power to determine the sequence, pace and topic 
discussed and can interrupt and demand a witness conform to the terms of the dialogue as set.  
A lawyer may also request that a judge compel a witness to answer on pain of a holding of 
contempt.  Witnesses have no comparable power.  Thus, the structural arrangements of the 
court evidence palpable power asymmetries.28  These asymmetries are most keenly observed 
in the context of the rape trial during the process of cross-examination.  This is when 
linguistic and sequential capital is harnessed most effectively by defence lawyers in the name 
                                                          
27 Conley and O’Barr above note 8; Ehrlich above note 8; Mark R. Kebbell, Steven Deprez and Graham F. 
Wagstaff, ‘The direct and cross-examination of complainants and defendants in rape trials: A quantitative 
analysis of question type’ (2003) 9 Psychology, Crime and Law 49; Mark R. Kebbell, Catriona M.E. O’Kelly 
and Elizabeth L. Gilchrist ‘Rape victims’ experiences of giving evidence in English courts: A survey’ (2007) 14 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 111; Luchjenbroers and Aldridge above note 8; Matoesian 1993, 2001, 2008, 
2013 above note 8; Zydervelt and others above note 8. 
28 Conley and O’Barr above note 8 at 21. 
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of ‘testing the veracity of the evidence’ and during which a victim is in the most powerless 
position.   
Gregory Matoesian’s work is extremely important for its careful chronicling of the 
discursive processes by which women’s experience of rape is routinely re-scripted as 
consensual sex, by courtroom linguistic practices which become, he says, the “ultimate 
weapon[s] of domination” during the rape trial.29  His research reveals powerful practices of 
‘sense-making’ within the trial, by which lawyers are empowered to control everything from 
the topic of discussion, to the syntactic form of questions, to other sequential resources of 
parlance and utterance.  Because access to these tools of talk are not distributed equally 
amongst trial participants, defence lawyers in particular benefit from a linguistic and 
sequential hierarchy in which their account of the event in question is given structural and 
logical priority to that of the victim.  Rape is reproduced, argues Matoesian, in real time 
“…through a multiplex of sequentially driven, institutionally anchored, and patriarchally 
organized forms of talk”.30  
An important tenet of Matoesian’s schema is his insistence on the analytic distinction 
between “patriarchal modes of domination” and “legal disciplinary regimes”.  These 
intersect, he says, during the trial to build the case for blame against the victim: “Rape myths, 
techniques of neutralization, or, more generally, patriarchal ideologies provide the linguistic 
rationalizations and interpretive frameworks for assessing the rape incident: for making sense 
of what happened, and for legitimating the sexual scripts governing male-female 
interactions”.31 Courtroom talk, says Matoesian, is an autonomous system of disciplinary 
power, “a system with its own internal logic, interacting with, yet in large measure 
independent from, patriarchal ideology in the rape trial”.  The forcing of inconsistent 
                                                          
29 Matoesian 1993 above note 8 at 1.   
30 As above at 2. 
31 As above at 13.   
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testimony is a generic courtroom tactic that is used in most trials, “having nothing to do with 
patriarchy, even though drawing on patriarchal ideology in the rape trial”. 
In a very Foucauldian way, while the legal system interacts with and draws on patriarchy 
in the rape trial, as it does with other social structures like class and race, it is not 
reducible to patriarchy, or to any other social structure, but functions instead as a distinct 
micro-mode of domination, a strict disciplinary system possessing an internally 
autonomous logic of knowledge, epistemology, and talk.32  
 
Matoesian seems to complicate his analysis of the intersection of legal discourse in 
the rape trial with patriarchal ideology in later work.33  In a painstaking analysis of the 
transcript of the William Kennedy Smith rape trial and associated media Matoesian exposes, 
in microscopic detail, how an array of strategies of legal method and trial rituals are 
“contextually anchored and incrementally realized in discursive practice”.34  The case 
concerned a prosecution for rape against William Kennedy Smith, the nephew of the late US 
President John F. Kennedy.  In Matoesian’s analysis the rhythms of domination and linguistic 
strategies that intersect in the trial generate a gendered “logic of inconsistency” which 
impacts disproportionately on a victim giving evidence.35 
Matoesian’s schema illustrates how the logic of inconsistency operates to align certain 
behaviour through tools of trial ‘talk’ with “the cultural demands of male sexual logic in a 
given context”.  This reveals, he says, “an inconsistency between the victim’s version of 
events and the expectations of patriarchal ideology governing victim identity”.36  Matoesian 
examines how the victim becomes complicit in her own subjection during the trial through 
engagement with what he calls the ascription of identities of sexual sameness/difference.37  
By this he means that sexual desire between the victim and defendant is said to calibrate 
                                                          
32 As above at 20. 
33 Matoesian 2001 above note 8 
34 As above at 3. 
35 As above at 37. 
36 As above at 40. 
37 As above at 38.   
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through “patriarchal sexual logic” before the alleged incident of rape, and then to diverge at a 
certain point subsequently.  This functions to illustrate both the irrationality of the victim’s 
logic but also the inherent rationality of patriarchal sexual logic.38  For example, a defence 
lawyer during the process of cross examination, “sets the victim up via that logic to 
participate in an interactional process that contributes to her own undoing”.39  By her very 
participation in and engagement with the topics and syntactic interaction of the specific mode 
of questioning, a victim tacitly affirms the relevance of certain topics, for example the 
consumption of alcohol, the sexualised mode of dress or appearance and other social and 
cultural tropes that feed into certain rape myth narratives.  The defendant, victim and jury, 
thus, have the ‘same’ idea of what is relevant and what the appropriate standard of behaviour 
is to be expected, which is then contrasted through defence cross-examination of the victim 
by her failure to perform these actions, and thus the irrationality or ‘difference’ of her logic. 
In his analysis of the Kennedy Smith rape trial Matoesian thus recognises the role of 
legal method in reproducing and constructing gendered bodies.  The “patriarchal logic of 
sexual rationality” describes the “situated rhythms of language in which the law and 
patriarchal hegemony are microcosmically embodied in and concealed through objective 
legal discourse”.40  Law, in this formulation, seems more intimately implicated in a 
conspiracy with “male-centred epistemology” to generate inconsistency in a victim’s account 
of rape.  Notwithstanding this conceptual move, Matoesian maintains the analytic distinction 
between the “cultural demands of male sexual logic in a given context”,41 and the linguistic 
and conversational patterns of talk within the courtroom which enable the specific 
constitution of the victim’s account as inconsistent.  However, he does seem to gesture 
                                                          
38 As above at 46.   
39 As above at 60. 
40 As above at 6.   
41 As above at 40. 
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towards an “absorption” of “patriarchal logic” into the master discourse of “legal reasoning” 
during the trial:   
…the epistemological hegemony of this linguistic ideology interacts with the legal field 
through the poetic structures of talk and the sexual order to appropriate or coopt a 
generic practical reasoning device – inconsistency – to disqualify the female experience 
of sexual violence and to naturalize its own arbitrary status.  The patriarchal logic of 
sexual rationality disappears during the transformation from bodily experience to the 
legal field and then reemerges cloaked as a neutral form of cultural/legal reasoning.42  
 
Matoesian’s analysis illustrates with great effectiveness the real-time marginalisation 
and discrediting of woman’s voice within the trial.  I want to argue that the women in 
Matoesian’s research function as the irrationality that demonstrates the rationality of both 
masculine desire and law’s logos.  While I agree with Matoesian that the tools of legal 
method militate to generate a ‘narrative of inconsistency’ in which woman becomes 
implicated, this is not, in my analysis, an anomalous or inconsistent coincidence of legal 
method and patriarchal ideology.  It is, rather, the inevitable conclusion of a system that 
refuses and erases woman whilst relying on her for the matter upon which its ego is built. 
 In what follows I attempt to re-situate Matoesian’s analytical reading of the dynamics 
of various discursive interactions occurring during the rape trial.  Matoesian’s work shows 
how the asymmetrical distribution of devices of discourse, and the specific deployment of 
procedures inherent to legal method, work to both silence and cow the complainant when she 
performs as witness.  What Matoesian doesn’t do, to the degree I argue is necessary at least, 
is think about why this process takes place and what conditions underpin, enable and maintain 
its logic.43  This is important because while critical of legal method and its manifestation in 
the rape trial, Matoesian’s framework leaves law itself insufficiently troubled. 
                                                          
42 As above at 68. 
43 Matoesian is not overly concerned with the question of why rape occurs although he does appear to adopt the 
radical feminist explanation for sexual violence against women (Matoesian 1993 above note 8 at 10-22), 
endorsing MacKinnon’s position that rape is a function of the masculine demand for unfettered sexual access to 
women’s bodies (see further, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism unmodified: Discourses on life and law 
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I argue that the law’s unwillingness to interrogate its own unconscious and the 
willingness of Matoesian and other critical rape scholars44 to leave untroubled law’s 
complicity with the phallogocentric symbolic order means that they are unable to see the way 
in which the law’s inability to respond to the crime of rape is inured within its very fabric.  If 
this is so, then Matoesian is wrong when he says that legal method is severable from 
‘patriarchy’; that law is always already existing above ideology in some pre-discursive void 
perverted by extra-legal considerations.  Similarly, we cannot simply sever the text of the law 
from its implementation in the trial in practice by various criminal justice actors, focusing 
only on the ‘attitudes’ of those who come into contact with it.  Law does not simply ‘interact’ 
with patriarchy to produce the conditions under which women are systematically prevented 
from representing the harm of rape to law, but law is predicated for its own survival on the 
erasure of the difference that would enable this articulation.  This has important consequences 
when it comes to consider the crime of rape but it also means that law is, at a very 
fundamental level, always already unable to appreciate and represent the harm of rape.   
In what follows I seek to chart the link between the necessary erasure of woman as 
subject from the Western philosophical and legal canon, and the establishment of law as an 
originary discourse.  I then go on to consider how the absence of an independent feminine 
subjectivity might have consequences for the rape victim in the trial. 
 
3.0  WESTERN THOUGHT AND THE DEATH OF THE MOTHER 
 
One thing is plain, not only in everyday events but in the whole social scene: our society 
and our culture operate on the basis of an original matricide.  When Freud, notably in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Harvard 1987), Towards a feminist theory of the state (Harvard 1989), Are women human? And other 
international dialogues (Harvard 2007)). “The interpretation and discovery of rape are organized around the 
patriarchal standpoint.  Hence, the force and coercion in rape are systematically concealed through the 
institutionalized power of law.” (Matoesian 1993 above note 8 at 19).  He does not, however, spend time 
thinking about how this “patriarchal standpoint” is generated in the first place. 
44 See in particular Ann J. Cahill, Rethinking rape (Cornell University Press 2001); Nicola Gavey, Just sex?  The 
cultural scaffolding of rape (Routledge 2005). 
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Totem and Taboo, describes and theorizes about the murder of the father as the founding 
act for the primal horde, he is forgetting an even more ancient murder, that of the 
woman-mother, which was necessary to the foundation of a specific order in the city.45  
 
Luce Irigaray’s analysis of the history of Western philosophy and psychoanalysis 
demonstrates in great detail how the masculine symbolic order is generated and sustained by 
the erasure of the ‘feminine’.  For Irigaray, matricide is a compulsory condition of the 
phallogocentric economy; it is the mode by which the dominant symbolic enacts its desire to 
exclude the mother and assume her generativity.   Her psychoanalytic reading of that 
economy is informed primarily by her insight that through a process of specularisation man 
projects his ego on to the world which is then reflected back to him with his own image.  
Woman, as body and matter, stands in for that reflective mirror.  It is the mother who is the 
primary support for the male imaginary, but because she also cannot be represented (because 
she is the mirror) she is symbolically murdered as part of the process by which man enters 
into culture.46  Woman is therefore simultaneously erased within the specular economy whilst 
also an integral part upon which it is founded.  This paradoxical dependence on and erasure 
of woman in culture is, as Irigaray suggests in the quotation above, a foundational 
contradiction upon which the whole ‘social scene’ rests.  In Cheryl Lawler’s words, 
[the mother]… is murdered again and again in our mythologies and in our theories.  It 
seems that she refuses to die once and for all, perhaps because it is her body/her blood… 
that is required to reproduce… the very culture that re-enacts her murder.47  
 
We see this motif of the dead mother repeat itself with surprising regularity in many 
of the most important Greek myths and tragedies, which continue to function as the 
foundation of the Western imaginary.  For Irigaray, Aeschylus’ Oresteia functions as the 
                                                          
45 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and genealogies (trans Gillian C. Gill) (Columbia University Press 1993) at 11. 
46 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the feminine (Routledge 1991) at 34. 
47 Cheryl Lawler, ‘Orestes with Oedipus: Psychoanalysis and matricide’ in Mary C. Rawlinson, Sabrina L. Hom 
and Serene J. Khader (eds) Thinking with Irigaray (2011) 13 at 20. 
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seminal patriarchal myth, and in particular the story of Clytemnestra.48  In that myth, 
Clytemnestra’s husband, Agamemnon, has been away for 10 years at war with Troy and, 
having heard nothing from him, she had assumed him dead.  Agamemnon eventually returns, 
having sacrificed his and Clytemnestra’s daughter, Iphigenia, in order to bring the expedition 
to a conclusion.  Upon his return, he is accompanied by Cassandra, his slave and lover.  
Filled with a righteous rage, Clytemnestra kills Agamemnon and Cassandra.  Supported by 
his sister, Electra, Clytemnestra’s son, Orestes, then kills his mother to restore order in the 
cosmos and in accordance with the oracle of Apollo, beloved son of the God-father, Zeus.  
Upon committing the act, Orestes is driven mad by the Furies, a troop of women in the image 
of his mother seeking vengeance.  Appealing to the goddess Athena for help, Orestes is 
eventually acquitted in a court of justice, and rescued from his madness, by virtue of her 
determining vote.  The murder of the mother in the myth results, says Irigaray,  
…in the non-punishment of the son, the burial of the madness of women – and the burial 
of women in madness – and the advent of the image of the virgin goddess, born of the 
father and obedient to his law in forsaking the mother.49  
 
The ‘virgin goddess’ Irigaray refers to is, of course, Athena, whose story is also 
integral to the Oresteia and, as Amber Jacobs argues, possibly the more important story.  The 
murder of Athena’s mother, Metis, “haunts” the Oresteia as a matricide “hidden and 
unspoken”.50  In the myth, Metis, goddess of wisdom, prudence and deep thought was 
captured and raped by Zeus.  Afraid of her generative power, Zeus tricked Metis into turning 
herself into a fly, and swallowed her. However, Metis was already pregnant with their 
daughter Athena and inside his stomach, Metis transmitted her knowledge and wisdom to 
Zeus.  Athena survived, and was ‘birthed’ wearing a coat of armour from the head of Zeus.  
                                                          
48 Aeschylus, Oresteia (trans. Christopher Collard) (Oxford World Classics 2001). 
49 Luce Irigaray, ‘The bodily encounter with the mother’ in Margaret Whitford (ed) The Irigaray reader (Wiley 
Blackwell 1991) at 37-38. 
50 Amber Jacobs, On matricide: Myth, psychoanalysis, and the law of the mother (Columbia University Press 
2008) at 60. 
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The myth reveals, in stark terms, the desire for matricidal violence that Irigaray argues is 
foundational in instituting a specific masculine symbolic order.  Zeus literally consumes 
Metis’ body, and with it, absorbs and assumes her wisdom and generative capacity.  Her 
womb is transferred to his brain and she is obliterated so completely that even Athena knows 
not of the maternal body in which she was conceived.51   
We see a similar pattern in law’s origin stories.  Feminist historians and legal theorists 
have long argued that women are excluded, denigrated and discriminated against by law.  
What I am interested in here, however, is the way in which legal norms, concepts, rules, and 
methods are incarnated, and rely for their coherence on this exclusion and denigration.  As 
will become apparent, this erasure takes place in order to ensure and protect law’s 
systematicity and its unity.  A good example of this particular phenomenon is the story of 
Lucretia and the foundation of the jurisdiction of law in the Roman Republic.  Fair, dutiful 
and chaste Lucretia was the wife of Collatinus, who had introduced her to Sextus Tarquin, the 
youngest son of Lucius Tarquinius Superbus seventh King of Rome.  Upon seeing her, 
Tarquin was “seized by the evil desire to debauch her”,52 and a few days later, made his way 
back to her home uninvited and without her husband’s knowledge, whereupon he was 
welcomed as a guest.  That evening he made his way to Lucretia’s bed chamber, sword in 
hand, and woke her.  He confessed his passion and desire for her and, through a combination 
of threats and entreaties, demanded she yield to him her chastity.  Lucretia refused, even 
under fear of death.  She yielded only when Tarquin threatened to disgrace her in death by 
leaving her body in her bed next to the naked body of a slave, evidence of adultery of the 
“basest sort.”  Distraught by her rape, Lucretia called her father and husband to her, each with 
a trusted friend.  She confessed the incident and pleaded that revenge be sought in her name.  
                                                          
51 As above at 63.  This figure of the omnipotent and divine god-father is familiar too in Christian mythology.  
As Lawler points out, “[b]y the time we arrive at the creation story in Genesis, any trace of the primordial 
mother has been erased.  What emerges is a solipsistic, male, creator god – Yahweh – absolutely transcendent to 
his creation.” (Lawler above note 47 at 20).   
52 Livy, The rise of Rome: Books 1-5 (trans T.J. Luce) (Oxford World Classics 1998) at 67. 
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Each of the men pledged to fulfil her wish, and offered her comfort.  Unmoved, Lucretia 
pledged to absolve herself “of wrong, but not of punishment”, and plunged a knife she had 
been hiding into her breast.53  In the wake of Lucretia’s sacrifice, Brutus, who had 
accompanied Collantinus, swore to vanquish the Tarquinius dynasty from Rome.  Urged by 
Brutus to take up arms and moved by the grief of her father, and the sight of Lucretia’s dead 
body, the popular uprising that followed in 509BC led to the establishment of the Roman 
republic. 
Maria Drakopoulou’s analysis of Lucretia’s death emphasises the legal credentials at 
the heart of story.54  A family court is convened at Lucretia’s request to adjudicate the matter.  
However, this legal process is unilaterally usurped by Lucretia who by passing a capital 
sentence upon herself suspends and renders null the existing procedure.  In so doing, says 
Drakopoulou, she initiates a “new dimension of critique of law”, directed not to her case, but 
the existing civic order, which is necessary to justify the vanquishing of the King and the 
birth of the Roman republic.55   Lucretia’s suicide is an act of “moral exaltation”, yet she 
herself is not driven by a desire for personal freedom or revolt against the existing social and 
political order.  Her death is necessary not as a “source of inspiration or active progress”, 
rather it is necessary because it “configures a female identity that is excluded from these 
politics.” 
With her life erased along with the law of kings, there is no place for Lucretia in the 
latter part of the story.  Banished from the space in which liberty and law come to reside, 
only her corpse – the enabling condition for the new law’s jurisdiction – enters the 
Forum.  And when revenge is taken in her name, when all those who are subjects of law, 
who establish laws and wield them, are present, she is not.  Lucretia has been exiled 
outside the time and space of the law to be.  Yet her dead body, lying at its origin, 
irrevocably grounds it in sexual difference.  Hence, Lucretia’s story is not merely one of 
law, it is one of law and sexual difference... 56 
                                                          
53 As above at 68.   
54 Maria Drakopoulou, ‘Of the founding of law’s jurisdiction and the politics of sexual difference: The case of 
Roman law’ in Shaun McVeigh (ed) Jurisprudence of jurisdiction (Routledge Cavendish 2007) 33.   
55 As above at 42. 




The account of the law’s reliance on a particular form of sexual difference that arises 
from Lucretia’s story mirrors the broader pattern excavated from Greek myth by Irigaray and 
others.  It is over Lucretia that wars are fought and liberty is secured, but it is only her death 
that enables this process.  How does the law continue to posit itself as the all-powerful, 
transcendent creator, and by which techniques does it erase woman as an independent subject 
in her own right?  In what follows I consider law’s modern origin story and the emergence of 
a form of legal discourse as a conceptual apparatus and a particular form of speech and 
method, which serves to instantiate and re-enact its own symbolic matricide. 
 
3.1  Law’s original matricide 
 
 Law’s modern origin story is one characterised by the association of law with divine 
will, and the dissociation of femininity from that will.  Peter Goodrich explores the origins of 
this contradiction in the context of legal history arguing that the problematic place, 
personality and political role of women also represented a significant constitutional problem 
for law.57  In a careful analysis of John Fortescue’s De Natura Legis Naturae,58 written in the 
early 15th century and one of the first treatises directly addressing women in law, Goodrich 
elaborates the various rules relating to the capacities and functions of women generally 
traceable to Roman law.  Exploring the law on succession, specifically, Goodrich unveils the 
links between English custom, divinity and nature, and in turn, the ultimate origin of law and 
laws in ‘God alone’.  Despite the “ineradicable origin and visceral transmission” of 
maternity, the mother is in civil law reconstituted as simply a facilitator of the paternal line. 
                                                          
57 Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, history, law (University of California Press 1995) at 118-119. 
58 John Fortescue, De natura legis naturae (1859) 
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The figure of maternity thus represents an aberration or excess in the polity.  This figure, says 
Goodrich, can at best only refer to a ‘plurality’ within jurisdictions; “[t]his plurality – this 
fluidity or contingency – of polities is potentially subversive of the hierarchy of laws…”59  
Goodrich investigates the development of a public law that served to institute a mode 
of thought that was also the limit of legal subjectivity.  Although that subjectivity recognised 
two sexes, “it relayed only one form of personality, one gender, a singular mask”.60  It is 
exceptional, he notes, the scope of legal sources drawn on to “substantiate the disassociation 
of the feminine imagery and grammatical gender of nature, justice, virtue, and the law from 
the dignity or civil office of women”.61  This allowed jurists of the time to substantiate as 
undeniable “[t]he inferiority of women within the hierarchy of ‘proper nature’ [as] a facet of 
the originary, of the state of innocence, and so an incontestable law of nature coincident with 
the spirit that preceded the generation of the sexes”.62  
The dissociation of woman from the origin or ‘nature’ of divinity and law, then 
facilitated an image of law that was said to belong to one order alone, to represent one source 
and to produce a singular testimony of reason.  In John Fortescue’s words: 
[J]ustice and the law of nature are proved to be of one substance… of one quality and 
nature... We are most surely instructed that the law of nature was created in one and the 
instant together with man; whence we are compelled to say that law and man are coeval, 
as were the first man, his reason, his will and his memory.63  
 
The image of justice is thus replaced by man, in the image of the father, an image 
coincident with law and whose genealogy is traceable back to the law of nature and to God 
Himself.  Therefore in Goodrich’s reading of Fortescue and the history of the common law 
we can see revealed both an original matricide upon which law can be said to construct its 
                                                          
59 Goodrich above note 57 at 123. 
60 As above at 130. 
61 As above at 128.   
62 As above at 129.   
63 Fortescue above note 58 at 243, cited in above at 130. 
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own body, but also the faint but undeniable figure of woman whose plural and fluid 
morphology is the ultimate threat to the systematicity, order and reason of judgment; that 
which could reveal the contingency of the whole enterprise and that “…escaped the unity of 
standard and sequence of law”.64  
The figure of the dangerous woman is also present in the conceptual forms that law 
relies on.  The concept of legal reason is one that has, of course, exercised jurists for centuries 
and more recently, been the subject of sustained feminist attention.65  ‘Reason’ is the great 
mechanism through which legal discourse is animated and endowed with its exalted scientific 
status.  In a critical rereading of St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, Margaret Denike 
argues that the doctrine of reason that emerges from Aquinas’ theology, a foundational 
treatise of natural law, is “conditioned on the repudiation of woman and the sin of the sex 
ascribed to her.”66  Aquinas’ association of woman with materiality and sexuality provides 
the rationale for her exclusion from social, religious and political life and underpins natural 
law and its contemporary iteration in human rights and humanitarian law.67  Man’s capacity 
for reason was the single most important mode through which he brought himself closer to 
the telos of his higher capabilities and thus, closer to God. In operating his capacity for reason 
man must distinguish himself from baser forms of existence consistently threatening his 
ability to actualise his potential and to participate in the eternal.  So great was the threat to 
man’s reason posed by the ‘venereal pleasures’ that women represented that man-made laws 
                                                          
64 As above at 138. 
65 See, for example: Joanne Conaghan, ‘Tort law and the feminist critique of reason’ in Ann Bottomley (ed) 
Feminist perspectives on the foundational subjects of law (Cavendish 1996), Law and gender (OUP 2013); 
Lucinda Finley, ‘Breaking women’s silence: The dilemma of the gendered nature of legal reasoning’ (1989) 64 
Notre Dame Law Review 886; Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The hidden gender of law (Allen and Unwin 
1990); Genevieve Lloyd, The man of reason: ‘Male’ and ‘female’ in western philosophy (Routledge 1984); 
Martha Minow, ‘Feminist reason: Getting it and losing it’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 47; Ulrike 
Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds) Gender and judging (Hart 2013); Smart above note 7. 
66 Margaret Denike, ‘The sex of right reason: Aquinas and the misogynist foundations of natural law’ in Maria 
Drakopoulou (ed) Feminist encounters with legal philosophy (Routledge 2013) at 20.   
67 As above at 21.   
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to guard against them were necessary.  These included a ban on fornication, which was said 
to so corrupt natural reason that it overruled the divine will.  Denike goes on: 
In this way the rightness of man’s reason is measured through the wrongness of the sex 
that weakens and nullifies it.  It is the sin of (the feminine) sex that has the power to 
throw the dignifying principle of man off its tracks, and so filthy is the thought of sexual 
encounters with women that both man and woman invariably lose their dignity through 
them: and while man may recover from such loss, there is no recovery for women 
stained by the sexual act… 68 
 
Just as the masculine logos relies for its coherence on an othering of women as 
emotional and irrational, weak and irresponsible, femininity is expelled from the legal form 
in order to buttress and sustain its particular view of itself.  This is true also of law as a 
discursive form.  As Elizabeth Grosz explains, woman’s erasure in discourse happens by way 
of self-referential systems of logic which are fundamentally partial:  
Discourses refuse to acknowledge that their own partiality, their own perspectivity, their 
own interests and values, implicitly rely upon conceptions of women and femininity in 
order to maintain their ‘objectivity’, ‘scientificity’, or ‘truth’ – that is, their veiled 
masculinity.69  
  
In his book, Languages of Law, Goodrich argues that the imagery of transmission by 
which law comes to posit itself as an originary discourse is sustained by rules, linguistic 
forms and techniques of interpretation which exceed the “memory of man” and which 
constitute more than mere language or vernacular.70  The logic of the common law, he argues, 
“has been one of a comparable lack of alternatives, of a refusal to recognize that vast host of 
the other… What is their place in the law, what is their voice, whose language do they 
use?”71  
                                                          
68 As above at 29. 
69 Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A feminist introduction (Routledge1990) at 180. 
70 Peter Goodrich, Languages of law: Logics of memory to nomadic masks (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1990) at 
vii. 
71 As above at 184.   
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Goodrich traces law’s language and links its particular vernacular dialect to its 
becoming present through divinity and memory.  The connection between memory and the 
legal community as theocratic allows law to posit itself as an original linguistic order in 
which law becomes the mouthpiece for a language to mediate between God and humanity.72 
This interpretative genealogy is sustained, says Goodrich, by rituals of jurisprudence that 
illustrate clear preferences for sources rather than arguments or dialogues, for validity rather 
than value, for judgment rather than justification or accountability as the authenticating marks 
of juridical speech.73  Those abstract legal terms embrace a particular syntactic and 
grammatical form that can be said to mirror the universalised masculine morphology 
privileging, as it does, a particular self-referential and contained mode of expression. 
Goodrich’s analysis illustrates with great clarity the deeply-engrained structure of the 
common law in which the habitual logic of law continues to “systematically [obliterate] 
difference in all its manifestations, in all its discourses”.74  An erasure of difference then 
occurs at all levels of the symbolic as it manifests in law, and this is enabled by a juridical 
framework which is contingent for its authority and therefore, its survival, on an origin or 
absolute other which is simultaneously evoked and erased.   
Discernible in this short history of the common law is a particular male angst 
regarding the ebb and flow of women’s bodies.  Irigaray has observed the ways in which this 
angst has instantiated itself within systems of representation and in particular an “historical 
lag in elaborating a ‘theory’ of fluids”, reflective perhaps of the fact that “women diffuse 
themselves according to modalities scarcely compatible with the framework of the ruling 
symbolics”.75  The equation between fluids and waste is said to justify “a complicity of long 
                                                          
72 As above at 95.   
73 As above at 109.   
74 As above at 184.   
75 Luce Irigaray, This sex which is not one (trans Catherine Porter) (Cornell University Press 1985) at 106.     
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standing between rationality and a mechanics of solids alone”.76  In the same way that man 
seeks to constitute himself without the mother, the law too erects itself from an 
undifferentiated subjectum that contains itself within itself, to the exclusion of all ‘others’.   
The argument I want to make here is that the history of legal discourse mirrors this 
process of exclusion and erasure almost exactly and that this allows law to both present its 
own logic as a priori, as neutral and as inevitable whilst also concealing the genesis of its 
own becoming.  This enables it then to refuse to acknowledge the other, to countenance even 
the possibility of another language, or another justice.  Thus, the erasure of the feminine, of 
woman, within the deep economy of language generally, is also found in legal discourse, and 
therefore also in the rape trial – the very space in which law has no choice but to confront 
woman.  As we will see, it deals with this confrontation in the only way it knows how: 
denying and erasing her difference, invoking her specular impossibility in order to shore up 
its own ego, and then transforming her into the double, defective or opposite of man.   
To return to my critique of Gregory Matoesian’s theoretical framing of law in the rape 
trial elaborated earlier, I want to reiterate the connection, or indeed the inseparability of the 
masculine logos from law’s logos, or in Matoesian’s words of ‘patriarchal ideology’ and legal 
discourse.  This is because the world of law is forever, at the very genesis of its becoming, 
closed to the cognisance of difference and in particular, sexual difference.  It is immersed 
within, it revels in, it magnifies and it takes to its logical conclusion the masculine specular 
economy.  The law functions as a closed system built on a repressed other, which is only 
coherent through a unified subject relation which requires the erasure of difference; the 
original matricide so carefully revealed by Irigaray in her excavation of Western thought, is 
also the origin upon which the legal system becomes coherent.  In other words, ‘patriarchy’ is 
                                                          
76 As above at 107.   
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inseparable from law because it is the very mode through which this discourse comes into 
being.   
 As discussed above, this contention is evidenced across two platforms: first, the 
symbolic system from which law claims its authority and second, the conceptual and 
discursive apparatus that support legal discourse and method.  These are made manifest in the 
micro-techniques of language that Matoesian so carefully documents in his analyses of rape 
trials.  These facets intersect but not in the way Matoesian thinks.  They are bound by a 
shared commitment to and reliance on the suppression of woman’s difference, whilst 
simultanously feeding on a ceaseless supply of “matter for the functioning of the same 
discourse”.77  In my argument this genealogy of law’s origin and unconscious not only sheds 
light on why legal method has been so effectively marshalled in the service of denying rape 
victims access to ‘justice’ in a traditional sense, but also why it remains impervious to liberal 
reform initiatives.  In what follows, I go on to explore the implications of this critique for 
feminist legal scholarship and engagement with state sponsored mechanisms for law reform.   
 
4.0  WOMAN’S VOICE/LAW’S LOGOS 
 
 
Although it posits itself as an originary discourse - a discourse freed from the 
contingencies of culture, history and the social – the history of the common law explored here 
reveals a contingency upon a symbolic matricide.  The spectre of woman’s morphology has 
been dealt with in philosophy and psychoanalysis with the symbolic coding of fluidity as 
waste, by the erasure of the possibility of another subjectivity, and the positing of the 
masculine subject position as universal.  Goodrich illustrates how this phenomenon has 
                                                          
77 Luce Irigaray, To speak is never neutral (trans Gail Schwab) (Continuum 2002) at 228.   
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manifested itself in law with the retrospective construction of law’s origin to erase the 
association of woman with nature and divinity (and therefore justice), and replace it with an 
image of justice as God the father.  It has also been addressed with the creation of rules and 
orders to control and confine women’s bodies, and systems to ensure the continuing mastery 
of man over law by the instantiation, and reiteration through legal method, of the vernacular 
dialect of legal discourse.  The law takes the logic of the masculine logos to its only 
conclusion and it is structurally invested, for its own survival and coherence, in the exclusion 
and erasure of woman’s voice, which represents the possibility of a plural form of being and 
thinking and is thus a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of law.   
The consequences of this analysis for complainants of rape who make it to trial can 
only be significant.  It is true, of course, of every adjudication that the law makes a 
pronouncement of ‘truth’ based on its assessment of the veracity of the evidence.  Matoesian 
and others argue that the difference with the rape trial is the ability of defence lawyers to call 
upon barely perceptible but powerfully palpable rape myths, or commonly exchanged 
narratives situating woman’s sexuality in accordance with a masculine standard of desire.78  
This is, of course, true.  However, in my argument the adjudication of rape is different not 
just because the normative or heuristic tropes relied upon by finders of fact are sexist but 
because their presence is generated from within, and sustained by, a logic that denies 
woman’s very subjectivity.  It is not enough, therefore, to call for jury instructions,79 or 
expert evidence,80 to counter the reliance of juries on rape myths to determine and dispense 
justice in rape trials.  These measures ultimately do little to challenge the structural coherence 
of the system as a whole and with it, the systemic inability to fathom what rape means. 
                                                          
78 See also Ehrlich above note 8. 
79 Kirsty Duncanson and Emma M. Henderson, ‘Narrative, theatre and the potential interruptive value of jury 
directions for rape trials in Victoria, Australia’ (2014) 22(2) Feminist Legal Studies 155. 
80 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E. Munro, ‘Turning mirrors into windows? Assessing the impact of (mock) juror 
education in rape trials’ (2009) 49(3) British Journal of Criminology 363. 
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Rape is different because it is gendered.  This is the case in some jurisdictions in 
which only a man can be a defendant to a charge of rape,81 and in a statistical sense (women 
are its main victims), but also because it demands the consideration of sexual difference.  It 
requires that woman narrate a confrontation with the real and in doing so that she relive the 
trauma of her symbolic homelessness in both her encounter with her rapist and her encounter 
with the law.82  As Louise du Toit argues so convincingly in her book A Philosophical 
Investigation of Rape, the harm of rape within the Western symbolic order is simply 
‘impossible’ to fathom.  Rape is fundamentally misconstrued within that symbolic and must 
instead, she says, be understood against the backdrop of a construction of woman’s 
subjectivity as borderline, highly ambiguous or unstable.83  The failure to recognise the harm 
of rape to woman as singular and sexuate subject in her own right means that the 
confrontation of woman during the act of rape with a fragmentary or partial subjectivity is 
replayed again in the courtroom, but this time woman is compelled to articulate a harm that 
has no name for an audience that can’t hear it.84  Law is complicit in a system of logic that 
reproduces and resubstantiates as natural, over and over again, a legal subject which 
excludes, excises and renders impossible woman’s very existence.   
Just because the underside of law’s unconscious is not so obvious in other cases 
doesn’t mean that ‘patriarchal ideology’ only activates itself during the rape trial, as Gregory 
Matoesian argues.85  The rape trial forces the confrontation of law with the contradiction of 
its own existence because it is at this point that law must confront the particularity of woman.  
                                                          
81 For example, in England and Wales see Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 1; New Zealand see Crimes Act 
1961, section 128; Ireland see Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, section 2. 
82 Russell above note 6 at 257. 
83 Louise du Toit, A philosophical investigation of rape: The making and unmaking of the feminine self 
(Routledge 2009) at 33.   
84 Irigaray prefers the term ‘sexuate difference’ in her later work to ‘sexual difference’.  She insists on this 
distinction in part as a way to deal with criticism that has conflated her use of the ‘sexual’ in sexual difference 
with sexuality. 
85 Matoesian 1993 above note 8 at 20.   
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This confrontation with the very essence of sexual difference and identity forces an eruption 
of the incoherence of law’s existence. 
While the process of objectifying woman during the trial is most keenly observed 
during cross-examination, the constrictions of legal procedure - the need for oral evidence, 
the requirements for formal speech, for sequential narrative, for clarity, for unequivocation - 
are also present during direct examination; the time during which the court allows the victim 
to tell her story.86  Woman remains, in this phase, mired within the phallogocentric logic in 
which her ability to represent herself as a subject may well be undercut by sexed syntactic 
conventions.87   
This is not to say that women are stripped of all agency by the logos of law, nor that 
women who come before the court to testify to their rapes do not on some occasions succeed 
in convincing a jury that they are telling the truth by successfully transforming the “pathos of 
[their] victimisation into the logos of accusation”.88  Wendy Larcombe’s research into 
characteristics of rape complainants whose cases resulted in successful prosecution illustrates 
how this process might occur, and she argues that her findings “disturb feminist 
understandings of how rape complaints are discredited in the criminal justice system”.89 
Larcombe sought to trace with her research the process by which complainants’ narratives of 
violation are either disqualified or validated during the process of the rape trial; her goal was 
                                                          
86 Kebbell and others 2003 above note 27; Larcombe above note 7.   
87 Luce Irigaray’s work on language is extensive and spans multiple methodological terrains including 
substantial empirical research into patterns of speech, grammar and syntax, and in particular the differences 
observable between women and men.   Irigaray illustrates the effect of the ‘veiled masculinity’ present in 
dominant language systems in her extensive empirical research into the relationship between philosophy and 
linguistics (Luce Irigaray, Le langage des dements (Mouton 1973), I love to you: sketch for a felicity within 
history, (trans Alison Martin) (Routledge 1996), To be two (trans Marco M. Rhodes and Monique F. Cocito-
Monoc) (Continuum 2000)).  This work argues that linguistics are marked by sexual difference through first the 
usage of ‘he’ and ‘she’, however her empirical work illustrates that even the personal pronoun ‘I’ is sexually 
marked.  Not only do men and women produce different elements of sexual difference through their respective 
speech, but the grammatical subject itself is also sexed: “grammar reflects, for both men and women, a 
valorization of masculinity and an erasure of femininity.” (Margaret Hass, ‘The style of the speaking subject: 
Irigaray’s empirical studies of language production’ (2000) 15(1) Hypatia 64 at 66.    
88 Young above note 4 at 465.   
89 Larcombe above note 7 at 132.   
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to trace a praxis of possible resistance to the discrediting processes used during the rape trial 
to disqualify the victim.  Larcombe surveys the various ways in which police, prosecutors and 
defence lawyers, amongst others, deploy tactics to discredit and cow a rape victim at every 
point of the justice process.  However, she argues that in her analysis of seven trials for rape 
in Australia, established feminist knowledge of which ‘types’ of rape victims are most likely 
to be believed by finders of fact was problematised by unexpected outcomes.  She 
summarises her conclusions thus: 
It can be seen that the “successful rape complainant” is not necessarily one with an 
unblemished sexual history. Rather, she has a strong sense of herself and takes overt 
offence at (rather than being taken by surprise or accepting as all too familiar) alternative 
and derogatory constructions of her character and credibility. She will need to be 
reasonably familiar with and experienced in managing power-loaded situations so that 
she can be polite but not compliant, co-operative but not submissive. She is not prone to 
exaggeration or embellishment but seems to talk straight. She answers questions quickly 
and precisely and speaks fairly frankly and without shame about sexual acts and 
activities.90  
 
Larcombe tentatively concludes her analysis with the assertion that the ‘ideal victim’ 
is unlikely to fall into the stereotypical category of the chaste, virtuous, ‘real rape’ victim so 
vaunted in classical literature, but instead is a victim who can perform with “resistance, 
continuity and consistency”.91   
The characteristics of the ‘ideal victim’ that Larcombe details above, while not 
necessarily exclusive, are interesting for a number of reasons, but particularly for my analysis 
                                                          
90 As above at 144.  Access to the discursive tools of resistance will, of course, be highly contingent on a 
complainant’s subject position: their class, race, ethnicity, whether they are able bodied or not, etc.  Indeed, 
Larcombe notes that “successful rape complainants in Australia are more likely working-class, young, able 
bodied, non-Aboriginal, English speaking women.” (as above).  On the rape of women and differential access to 
criminal justice mechanisms due to racial difference see further: Patricia Hill Collins, Fighting words: Black 
women and the search for justice. (University of Minnesota Press 1998); Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing 
the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and 
antiracist politics.’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139; Danielle L. McGuire, At the dark end of the 
street: Black women, rape, and resistance - A new history of the civil rights movement from Rosa Parks to the 
rise of black power (Vintage 2011).  
91 Larcombe above note 7 at 146.  Larcombe takes no solace in her conclusions: “There is no cause for 
celebration here, however. Even if women are no longer primarily disqualified on the basis of sexual and/or 
moral conduct, the discursive resistance that appears to characterize successful complainants is similarly 
exacting.” (As above at 145).   
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because they seem to describe a complainant who can, within the trial, transform herself most 
effectively into the double of man, who can harness law’s logos, and who can speak most 
articulately through that dialect.  In my argument this conclusion is far from surprising given 
the juridical and discursive strictures operating within the trial. 
To return to where I started this discussion with the voice of Frances Andrade, it is 
perhaps easier to appreciate the circumstances that might coalesce during the rape trial to 
generate an experience for a victim which is ‘fragmentary’.  With the wholesale rejection and 
exclusion of a female imaginary in both language and in law, it is only logical for these 
reasons that a woman would, in Irigaray’s words, “…experience herself only fragmentarily, 
in the little-structured margins of a dominant ideology, as waste, or excess, what is left of a 
mirror invested by the (masculine) ‘subject’ to reflect himself, to copy himself”.92  Because 
woman cannot take the form of the signifier except as emptiness it is very difficult for woman 
to constitute herself within the dominant symbolic as anything other than an object.  This has 
serious implications for a rape victim attempting to speak the harm of rape to law because 
law requires that the speaking subject enunciate her injury, which can only be done if warped 
into the language that the logos allows.  Because this injury has no value in the dominant 
symbolic – because woman has no value - the recognition of any injury is contingent upon a 
translation of woman within the space to double, defective or opposite of man.  There is, 
therefore, no necessary correlation between a woman complainant’s understanding or 
explanation of the event, and the law’s understanding.   
The fragmentation of woman during the trial then is a consequence of both the 
exclusion of a female imaginary, but also of law’s dogged adherence to the principal tenets of 
phallogocentrism in which woman’s status in the dominant symbolic is only as object, waste 
or excess.  The law’s treatment of the crime of rape is, far from being anomalous, actually the 
                                                          
92 Irigaray above note 75 at 30.   
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logical conclusion of the order of the world according to masculine logic.  The failure of rape 
law to do what it says it will do (protect the ‘sexual autonomy’ of all individuals), is actually, 
paradoxically, not a failure but a success because it shows how phallogocentrism consumes 
its subjects within a closed system in which the pieces can be moved around but the 
underlying logic remains the same.   
Earlier, I alluded to the myriad of reforms both proposed and implemented in various 
Western jurisdictions to address factors that had been identified as contributing to attrition 
rates at the point of the rape trial.  These included: the implementation of new rules in sexual 
offence trials designed to counter the reliance of lawyers and jurors on evidence designed 
purely to impugn a victim’s credibility;93 the development of prosecutorial expertise and 
specialism in sexual offences trials; the use of expert evidence in trials aimed at dispelling 
rape myths to assist the jury in its deliberations; the briefing of complainants prior to trial; the 
recording of complainants when they make initial statements to police to be used as evidence 
in court and; the use of screens in court to protect the victim while giving evidence.  These 
reform proposals and initiatives have been, in the main, directed at empowering the victim as 
speaking subject within the rape trial.  Many have sought to address the power asymmetries 
illustrated by Matoesian and others, for example, by providing victims with advocates and 
their own legal representation, by allowing evidence to be given behind a screen or by 
videolink, or by written submission bypassing the courtroom altogether.94  In many ways 
                                                          
93 For example, in England and Wales, section 32 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 abolished 
the requirement in sexual offences trials that the judge issue a warning to the jury that a woman’s evidence 
alone, in the absence of independent corroboration, must be treated with caution and section 41 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sought to restrict the use of previous sexual history evidence in rape 
trials.  Section 112 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amended the power to admit consistent statements of 
complaint by repealing the requirement that the complaint must be made “as soon as could reasonably be 
expected after the alleged conduct”.  Carline and Easteal describe this suite of measures as “the most radical 
rewriting of the orthodox rules for treatment of witnesses in the adversarial trial system in the common law 
world.” (Anna Carline and Patricia Easteal, Shades of grey - Domestic and sexual violence against women 
(Routledge 2014) at 199). 
94 Ministry of Justice, First victims spared harrowing court room under pre-recorded evidence pilot (online) 28 
Apr 2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-victims-spared-harrowing-court-room-under-pre-
recorded-evidence-pilot accessed 31 July 2016. 
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these reforms can be read less as ‘improvements’ in the law per se, than as adjustments 
designed to ‘soften’ or mitigate the essential (masculine) nature of law by taking into account 
woman’s nature.  Read in this way, law seems to listen to the other and take account 
accordingly.  Except, this is not what is happening at all.  The ‘other’ in this formulation, 
remains stuck within the old dream of symmetry;95 woman is simply the other of the same 
(the double of man) and the law attempts through reform initiatives to cure the defect of 
woman by concessions to her frailty.  It makes no ultimate concession to the existence of a 
unique subjectivity, which it is essential to have access to in order to testify to the harm of 
rape.  These measures are primarily formulated as matters of access and training - learning to 
speak to law more effectively on its own terms - whether this is behind a video screen or 
through an appropriately briefed advocate, or via laws of evidence which preclude the 
consideration of evidence designed to impugn the complainant’s credibility, thus potentially 
blocking her access to ‘justice’.  There is no sense in which the very coherence of law’s logos 
is troubled or called into question; law remains static, buttressed by its history and the 
invisible genealogy of its own logic.  It is we who have to change, ultimately, so that law can 
hear us better. 
 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
My analysis in this article has sought to draw together sometimes disparate bodies of 
literature in the service of trying to comprehend the law’s treatment of rape complainants, 
particularly those who find themselves testifying to their rape during the trial.  I have argued 
that previous writing on rape, law and linguistics has failed to adequately account for the 
                                                          
95 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the other woman (trans Gillian C. Gill 1985) at 11-24.  See also, Ngaire Naffine, 
“Possession: Erotic love in the law of rape.” (1994) 57(1) Modern Law Review 10. 
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question of why law continues to appear systematically deaf to the calls of untold numbers of 
women for justice in the aftermath of rape.  I have sought to shed light on this question by 
arguing that law is not simply separable from the masculine logos and malleable at will.  It is 
instead in thrall to the phallogocentric symbolic for its own survival.  The instantiation of a 
system of logic governed by binary pairs and the process by which law comes to posit itself 
as an originary discourse mirrors the process by which Western philosophy and 
psychoanalysis come to symbolically murder the mother in order for man to place himself at 
the centre of a closed universe.  The law is also a closed universe which consciously excludes 
the other in the name of a higher absolute: justice.  It is simultaneously reliant on the 
exclusion of the feminine and dependent on the feminine other as a mirror.   
What are the implications of this analysis, of exposing the contingency of law’s logic 
and its steadfast complicity with the sexual indifference of the masculine logos?  I suggested 
that one implication is the failure of law to respond to crimes against women, and specifically 
the crime of rape.  In order to acknowledge the harm of rape, law must acknowledge woman 
as subject. 
I do not mean to imply with this analysis that we should abandon our struggles with 
law in the present.  Nor do I mean to suggest that recently proposed law reform initiatives 
addressed to improving the complainant’s experience of the trial would have made no 
difference to Frances Andrade, and others like her.  But I do want to suggest that it is 
important to recognise that work on reforming the trial process is but one feminist task of 
many.  A feminist ethics of sexual difference confronts law’s treatment of the crime of rape 
on multiple levels, it exposes its every move, its a priori logic, its very core.  It forces it into a 
confrontation with the other, until it has no choice but to confront itself.  It does this 
relentlessly, at every turn, at every opportunity.  But most important of all perhaps: it listens. 
